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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Schultz appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon her guilty 
plea to burglary. Specifically, she claims that the court erred by failing, sua 
sponfe, to order a psychological evaluation for purposes of sentencing. She also 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction over her case and ordered her original sentence executed. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On January 20, 2006, Deputy Talamantes was dispatched to Angela's 
Restaurant in Burley, Idaho. (R., p. 12.) When he arrived, he spoke with Angela 
Garcia. (R., p. 12.) Ms. Garcia told him that she was preparing to close the 
restaurant when a female walked in who appeared to be very upset and was 
crying. (R., p. 12.) The woman told Ms. Garcia that she was leaving her 
husband and needed money for fuel. (R., pp. 12-13.) She then asked Ms. 
Garcia if there was anything that she [Ms. Garcia] could do. (R., p. 13.) Ms. 
Garcia told her "no," and woman then asked to use the telephone. (R., p. 13.) 
Ms. Garcia directed the woman to the phone and returned to help some 
customers. (R., p. 13.) Ms. Garcia saw the woman leave the restaurant. (R., p. 
13.) When Ms. Garcia finished with her customers, she went into the office so 
that she could get the restaurant key out of her purse to lock the restaurant for 
the night. (R., p. 13.) She then noticed that her pink wallet was missing. (R., p. 
13.) It contained $40.00, her driver's license, a Costco card, a Maurices credit 
card, and another credit card. (R., p. 13.) She immediately called and cancelled 
her credit cards. (R., p. 13.) 
Ms. Garcia gave Deputy Talamantes a description of the woman who had 
I 
entered her restaurant and used the phone. (R., p. 13.) She also told the deputy 
that she was only away from the office for about 2 minutes and that there was no 
other person in or around the office during that time. (R., p. 13.) Another officer 
I 
noticed that the description of the woman matched the description of Olivia 
I Schultz, whom he knew from earlier contacts. (R., p. 13.) Ms. Garcia identified 
I Schultz as the woman who took her wallet out of a photo line-up. (R., p. 13.) 
The state charged Schultz with grand theft of a financial transaction card 
and burglary. (R., pp. 19-20.) Schultz pled guilty to burglary pursuant to a plea 
agreement with the state where the state agreed to dismiss the grand theft 
charge. (319106 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 20-22.) The state also agreed that at sentencing it 
I would ask for a two year determinate sentence followed by six years 
I indeterminate, that the sentence be suspended, that Schultz be placed on 
supervised probation, and that she spend 60 days in jail. (3/9/09 Tr., p. 12, L. 22 
- p. 13, L. 8.) Schultz retained the right to request a lesser sentence. (3/9/06 
Tr., p. 13, Ls. 8-9.) Schultz failed to appear at her sentencing and a bench 
warrant was issued for her arrest. (R., pp. 29-31 .) 
At her sentencing, the district court concluded that Schultz was not a good 
candidate for probation and sentenced her to eight years with two years fixed 
and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 38-41.) Schultz filed a motion to reconsider her 
sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp. 46-58.) 
Schultz completed her rider and, on November 2, 2006, and was placed 
on supervised probation for a period of three years. (Augment - Suspension of 
Sentence and Order of Probation.) A term of her probation was that she apply 
for and be evaluated by the Fifth District Mental Health Court. (Augment - 
Suspension of Sentence and Order of Probation, p. 4.) Schultz was accepted 
into the Fifth District Mental Health Court but decided that she didn't want to 
participate because, as the mental health coordinator explained: "Ms. Schultz 
advised me that she had exaggerated her symptoms to the Mental Health 
Clinician in an effort to ensure she would continue to receive medication. She 
further stated she didn't think her mental illness was severe enough to qualify her 
for Mental Health Court." (Augment - Letter to District Court from Fifth District 
Mental Health Court Program, dated December 15,2006.) 
A report of probation violation, dated March 19, 2007, was filed against 
Schultz alleging nine separate rule violations. (Augment - Report of Probation 
Violation, dated March 19, 2007.) Schultz admitted to the probation violations. 
(1 1/2/06 Tr., p. 25, L. 24 - p. 26, L. 3'.) Based on Schultz's representations that 
she was still interested in Mental Health Court, the district court delayed 
disposition on the probation violations so that she could reapply. (1 1/2/06 Tr., p. 
33, L. 24 - p. 34, L. 4.) Schultz was not re-accepted into mental health court. 
(711 9/07 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 19-24.) 
Between November 2, 2006, when Schultz was first placed on probation, 
and her probation violation disposition hearing on July 19, 2007, she was 
' The 11/2/06 Transcript also contains the 4/26/07 Probation Violation 
Arraignment and the 5/03/07 Probation Violation Hearing. 
3 
convicted of an additional felony in Twin Falls County and disposition on a 
second felony in Twin Falls County was pending. (711 9/07 Tr., p. 6, L. 15 - p. 7, 
L. 25.) The Twin Falls County district court retained jurisdiction in both cases. 
(7119107 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 18-25; 12/10107 APSI, Cover letter.) Based in part on 
sentences in the new Twin Falls County cases, the district court reluctantly gave 
Schultz the opportunity to complete a second rider. (7119107 Tr., p. 10, L. 21 - p. 
I I L. 8.) At the conclusion of her second rider, the warden at the correctional 
center recommended that the court relinquish jurisdiction. (12/10107 APSI, Cover 
letter.) After the jurisdictional review hearing, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction and ordered Schultz's original sentence imposed. (12/14/07 Tr., p. 
15, L. 25-p. 16, L. 16.) 
Schultz filed a notice of appeal after her original imposition of sentence on 
July 21, 2006, when she was placed on her first rider. (R., pp.59-60.) Because 
the notice of appeal was not field within 42 days of entry of judgment, this Court 
entered an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal. Schultz filed a response 
pointing out that the retained jurisdiction extended the time for appeal, and the 
court reinstated the appeal on September 3, 2006. (Response to Conditional 
Dismissal; Order Reinstating Appeal.) Schultz then failed to pursue her appeal 
for eighteen months, and did not file anything further until March 31, 2008, when 
her attorney filed a Motion to Augment Record. (Motion to Augment.) This 
appeal followed. 
ISSUES 
Schultz states the issues on appeal as: 
1 Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua 
sponfe order a mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing 
in this case? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case and executed her original 
sentence of eight years with two years fixed? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Schultz failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
when it failed to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation for purposes of 
sentencing in this case? 
2. Has Schultz failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over her case and executed her original 
sentence of eight years with two years fixed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
y 
Not Sua Sponfe Orderina Schultz To Underao A Psvcholoaical Evaluation Prior 
To Sentencing 
I A. Introduction 
Conceding that she did not request the district court to order a 
I psychological evaluation, Schultz asserts that the district court manifestly 
I 
disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d) by not sua sponfe ordering a 
psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-13.) 
i 
I Schultz, however, has failed to establish that the district court manifestly 
disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32 or abused its discretion by failing to sua i 
sponte order such an evaluation. 
B. Standard of Review 
I 
I A sentencing court's determination of whether to obtain a psychological 
I evaluation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 
442,974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. The Issue Of Whether The District Court Manifestly Disreaarded The 
Provisions Of I.C.R. 32 At Sentencina Is Moot 
It is well established that an appellate court does not decide moot issues. 
An issue is moot if it "presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial 
I determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome" of the case. 
Comm. for Rational Predator Mamt. v. Dep't of Aaric., 129 ldaho 670, 672, 931 
I 
P.2d 1188, 1190 (1997) (quoting ldaho Schs. for Eaual Educ. Opportunity v. 
ldaho State Bd. Of Educ., 128 ldaho 276, 281-82, 912 P.2d 644, 649-50 (1996)); 
Russell v. Fortney, 11 1 ldaho 181, 182, 722 P.2d 490,491 (Ct. App. 1986); see 
also McKinney v. State, 133 ldaho 695, 705, 992 P.2d 144, 154 (1999). Here, 
-
even if this Court were to determine that the district court erred in failing to sua 
sponfe order a psychological evaluation, such a determination would have no 
practical effect upon the outcome of the case because, at her second rider 
review hearing, the district court had ample information concerning Schultz's 
mental health and had received at least one complete mental health evaluation 
prior to its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and to not modify her sentence. 
Thus, whether the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a 
psychological evaluation at her original sentencing is moot. 
As a term of her probation, Schultz was ordered to be assessed for her 
eligibility to participate in the Fifth Judicial District Mental Health Program. 
Presumably, this assessment included a mental health evaluation, and Schultz 
qualified for the program. (Augment - letter from Fifth Judicial District Mental 
Health Program, dated December 15, 2006.) Schultz, however, declined to 
participate, telling the Mental Health Clinician that she exaggerated her 
symptoms in an effort to ensure that she would continue to receive medication. 
(a) An additional term of her probation included that she participate in all 
mental health programs ordered by her probation officer. (Augment - 
Although Schultz could have immediately raised this argument after her 
sentencing, she failed to pursue her appeal for over 18 months. During that time 
she received the benefit of probation and a second rider after her probation 
violation, but nevertheless failed to raise this argument until she was finally 
sentenced to prison. 
Suspension of Sentence and Order of Probation.) She failed to attend individual 
counseling sessions as ordered and failed to attend several other required 
classes. (Augment - Report of Probation Violation.) 
After her probation was revoked and while on her second rider, Schultz 
received a mental health evaluation. (12/10/07 APSI, p. 4.) The mental health 
evaluation concluded: 
I 
Ms. Schultz demonstrated compliance during her first rider 
and completed the expectafions of the required groups. However, 
it is evident that this treatment was not sufficient in addressing 
'issues that prevent her from being successful in the community. 
She failed to participate in mental health services provided in the 
community. She was unable tomaintain appropriate living situation 
or employment. She continues to rely on maladaptive behaviors 
rather than healthy coping skills. Ms. Schultz had a limited time at 
SBWCC to participate in a second rider (90 days). She has not 
exhibited significant insight to expect substantial behavior changes 
or an ability to be successful in the community at this time. She 
continues to minimize and justify her behaviors. It is unlikely that 
the rider program provides enough time to address the needs of 
this individual. 
(12/10/07 APSI, Mental Health Evaluation.) 
The district court had ample information before it concerning Schultz's 
mental health at her second rider review hearing, and, nonetheless, decided to 
relinquish jurisdiction and order her original sentence imposed. For this reason, 
whether the district court erred in failing to order a psychological evaluation is 
moot. 
D. Schuitz Has Failed To Establish That By Not Sua Sponte Orderinq A 
Psycholoqical Evaluation Prior To Sentencinq, The District Court 
Manifestlv Disreqarded The Provisions Of I.C.R. 32 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522(1), "[ilf there is reason to believe the mental 
condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good 
cause shown, the court shall appoint at least one ( I )  psychiatrist or licensed 
psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant." 
Where a defendant fails to request a psychological evaluation or object to the 
PSI on the ground that an evaluation has not been performed, a defendant must 
demonstrate that by failing to order a psychological evaluation the court 
"manifestly disregarded" the provisions of I.C.R. 32. Jones, 132 ldaho at 442, 
974 P.2d at 88, citing State v. Wolfe, 124 ldaho 724, 727, 864 P.2d 170, 173 (Ct. 
App. 1993). Manifest injustice requires more than a mere contention, "raised for 
the first time on appeal, that compliance with the report was simply inadequate - 
e.g., that the report should have developed a particular point further, or that 
certain information was incomplete or inaccurate." State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 
565, 566, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982). "Those are matters to be raised at 
the sentencing hearing." w, 103 ldaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 710. 
The minimum requirements for presentence investigative reports are set 
forth in I.C.R. 32. m, 103 ldaho at 566, 650 P.2d at 709. I.C.R. 32(b)(10) 
requires a PSI to include the PSI writer's "analysis of the defendant's condition." 
It "should" include a summary of the presentence investigator's view of the 
psychological factors surrounding the commission of the crime or regarding the 
defendant individually which the investigator discovers. I.C.R. 32(b)(10). "Where 
appropriate, the analysis should also include a specific recommendation 
regarding a psychological examination and plan of rehabilitation." Id. While a 
presentence investigator may recommend a psychological evaluation, the 
decision of whether to order one is left to the sentencing judge. I.C.R. 35(d). 
I 
The state asserts that a claim of "manifest disregard" of I.C.R. 32 must be 
I supported by evidence of "disregard" of that rule. Here, there is no evidence of 
"disregard," let alone "manifest disregard" of I.C.R. 32. In fact, the evidence is to 
I the contrary. The district court had ample I.R.E. 32(b)(10) evidence before it 
concerning Schultz's psychological condition. The information before the district 
I 
court included a letter from Michael Waite, LCSW, dated April 10, 2006. (PSI, p. 
1!j3.) Mr. Waite conducted an assessment of Schultz on October 11, 2005 and 
I recommended that she continue with individual therapy, which Schultz failed to 
do. (PSI, p. 15.) Mr. Waite determined that most of Schultz's problems were 
related to substance abuse rather than mental health. (PSI, p. 15.) He 
concluded that "based on her noncompliance with mental health treatment and 
due to the fact that there is not an underlying mental illness, I do not believe her 
to be a good candidate for treatment at mental health at this time." (PSI, p. 15.) 
In addition, the district court had treatment records from St. John's Mercy 
Medical Center in St. Louis, Missouri, where Schultz had been treated as a 
teenager. (PSI, pp. 16-36.) The records included a psychological evaluation 
dated August 24, 1992, where Schultz was diagnosed as having dysthymic 
disorder. (PSI, pp. 8, 16-19.) At St. John's Medical Center, Schultz was also 
Unnumbered pages of PSI numbered sequentially 
diagnosed as having depression, a conduct disorder and fetal alcohol syndrome. 
(PSI, pp. 8, 22.) One year later, Schultz was readmitted to St. John's Medical 
Center and was again diagnosed with a conduct disorder. (PSI, p. 27.) 
The district court also had a letter from Schultz's adoptive mother, who 
explained Schutz's mental health history and her history of acting out as a child. 
(PSI, pp. 5-6.) 
Finally, as required by I.C.R. 32(d)(10), the PSI included an "analysis of 
the defendant's condition," which included a "summary of the of the presentence 
investigator's view of the psychological factors surrounding the commission of 
the crime or regarding the defendant individually." (PSI, pp. 10-11.) In her 
summary, the PSI writer discussed Schultz's criminal history, her marital history, 
and her social history, including that she had several children taken away from 
her. (PSI, p. 10.) The PSI writer also wrote that Schultz was unemployed and 
was described as a "con woman" by Heath and Welfare. (PSI, p. 10.) The 
summary also included that Schultz was abused prior to being adopted at age 5, 
that she was in counseling throughout her teenage years, that she had been 
diagnosed with several mental disorders, and that she had recently received a 
mental health evaluation but had been failed to follow through with treatment 
recommendations. (PSI, p. I I .) 
The presentence investigator determined that "[ijt would be to [Schultz's] 
benefit to follow through with Mr. Waite's recommendation to participate in 
individual therapy." (PSI, p. 9.) She recommended that the district court retain 
jurisdiction so that Schultz could be evaluated while on her rider program and be 
placed in the appropriate programs to address her substance abuse issues, 
assess her mental health needs, provide parenting education, and help her gain 
the necessary tools to complete a successful probation. (PSI, p. I I .) 
Rather than "manifest disregard," the record shows, and Schultz 
concedes, that the district court was well aware of the degree to which Schultz's 
mental health presented a factor in fashioning an appropriate sentence. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 1 I.) Both the prosecuting attorney and Schultz's defense 
attorney discussed Schultz's mental health issues at length. (519106 Tr., p. 5, L. 
24 - p. 6, L. 16; p. 9, L. 12 - p. 10, L. 15.) In its decision to retain jurisdiction, the 
district court concluded, "I think that [at the correctional center] she can be placed 
in an appropriate program, they can address her substance abuse issues and 
assess her mental health needs there and even parenting education, and I think 
that will help her gain the necessary tools that she needs at this point to serve a 
successful probation." (519106 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 19-25.) 
Given the PSI writer's adherence to the requirements of I.R.E. 32 and the 
abundance of information included in Schultz's PSI concerning Schultz's 
psychological state, it is apparent that neither the presentence investigator nor 
the district court "manifestly disregardled]" the provisions of I.C.R. 32. 
Although Schultz briefly references the "manifest disregard" standard in 
her brief, she ignores this standard in her discussion. Rather, she simply asserts 
that the record indicates that her mental health was a significant factor at 
sentencing. She utterly fails to show how the district court "manifestly 
disregarded" the provisions of I.C.R. 32. Because she failed to request an 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 below, she must show more than alleged 
I inadequate compliance with I.C.R. 32. 
Proper application of the "manifest disregard" standard of review to 
Schultz's presentence report reveals far more than minimal compliance with 
I I.C.R. 32. Consequently, Schultz has failed to carry her burden of showing that 
the district court "manifestly disregarded" the provisions of I.C.R. 32. 
I 
E. The Court Did Not Manifestlv Disreqard The Provisions Of I.C.R. 32 
I 
Because Schultz's Mental Health Was Mot A Significant Factor At 
Sentencinq For Which There Was Good Cause To Order An Evaluation 
The district court's obligation under 5 19-2522 is to order a psychological 
I 
evaluation if "there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will 
I be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown." Because the 
district court carefully explained his reasoning for the sentence imposed and it is 
clear that the result would not change, even if the court had the benefit of a 
I 
1 psychological evaluation, there is no basis to conclude that Schult'z mental 
health condition was a significant factor or that she had shown good cause for an 
1 
evaluation. 
1 
A defendant's mental condition can be a significant factor at sentencing 
when that condition may be a key underlying factor in the defendant's 
commission of the crime at issue, especially when the defendant's actions are 
, radically contrary to his history and character. State v. French, 95 ldaho 
1 853, 855, 522 P.2d 61, 63 (1974) (family man and dependable worker with no 
prior criminal record inexplicably raped his estranged wife at knife point); State v. 
McFarland, 125 ldaho 876, 877-79, 876 P.2d 158, 159-61 (Ct. App. 1994) (young 
man with extremely low intelligence from a dysfunctional family and with no prior 
violent offenses, who suffered from an unspecified mental disability and was 
unable to remember robbing his victim, beating him unconscious, taking his knife, 
and stabbing him to death); State v. Sabin, 120 ldaho 780, 783-84, 820 P.2d 
375, 378-79 (Ct. App. 1991) (fifty-four-year-old family man, with a solid work 
history and no prior criminal record, who sexually abused a thirteen-year-old girl 
and admitted to molesting his two step-daughters and inappropriately touched 
three other girls; in addition, a psychological evaluation was recommended by 
the presentence investigator who could not determine the defendant's prospects 
for rehabilitation or recommend probation without the examination, and defense 
counsel voiced his dissatisfaction with the lack of a psychological evaluation). 
The purpose of a court-ordered psychological evaluation is to assist the 
sentencing court in assessing the defendant's capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the requirements of 
the law at the time of the offense. State v. Collins, 144 ldaho 408,409, 162 P.3d 
787, 788 (Ct. App. 2007); I.C. 3 19-2523(1)(f). The evaluation can also aid the 
sentencing court in determining whether to authorize psychological treatment 
during a defendant's confinement or probation. &; I.C. 3 19-2523(2). 
Unlike the cases cited above, Shultz exhibited no uncharacteristic or 
irrational behaviors prior to or during her criminal proceedings. In fact, her 
commission of this crime conforms with Health and Welfare's description of her 
as a "con woman" (PSI, p. lo),  as do her statements to the mental health court 
that "she exaggerated her symptoms ... to ensure that she would continue to 
receive medication" (Augment - Letter to District Court from Fifth District Mental 
Health Program, dated December 15, 2006). Further, there is no indication in the 
record that a psychological evaluation would have aided the court is assessing 
Schultz's true culpability for her offense, her suitability for probation, or the type 
I 
I of treatment to be ordered. 
1 At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that Schultz was not a 
candidate for probation. (519106 Tr., p. 15, L. 14 - p. 16, L. 12.) In reaching this 
conclusion, the court, after discussing Schultz's significant misdemeanor history, 
reasoned: 
So I'm dealing with a 30-year old female who certainly has 
had some criminal problems. It would appear that she's got some 
mental health issues. The problem I have is that she was given an 
opportunity for some mental health treatment and she declined or 
left or otherwise didn't get that treatment. 
She is unemployed and she collects social assistance for 
food and for her housing. The people at Health & Welfare have 
investigated her and describe her as a con woman who uses 
people in order to get what she needs. She's had four children 
taken away at birth by Health & Welfare including twins that were 
taken away. 
Even in this case her failure to appear requiring this Court to 
issue a bench warrant would signify to this Court that this woman is 
not a candidate for probation. 
(519106 Tr., p. 15, L. 14 - p. 16, L. 6.) The district court concluded: 
I think that if I attempted to give her probation all I'm doing is setting 
her up to fail. I think she poses a risk to society. I think she needs 
to through the best form of rehabilitation that we can give her at this 
point. I think that's the rider program. 
(519109 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 6-12.) 
Even if the court had had a psychological evaluation, it would still have 
denied Schultz the initial opportunity for probation based upon her past record, 
her failure to follow through with recommended mental health treatment in the 
past, and her failure to appear for court. Not insignificantly, it fashioned its 
sentence with an awareness that Schultz had some mental health issues that 
needed to be addressed as part of its sentence. (519106 Tr., p.15, Ls. 14-20.) 
I 
I 
I The court's sentence adequately addressed those mental health concerns by 
I giving Schultz the opportunity to participate in the rider program where she could 
I 
be further evaluated and could receive the necessary tools to be successful on 
1 
I probation in the future. (519106 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 19-25.) 
I 
Schultz cites State v. Banbury, 145 ldaho 265, 178 P.3d 630 (Ct. App. 
2007) and State v. Coonts, 1374 ldaho 150, 44 P.3d 1205 (Ct. App. 2002), to 
support her assertion that a psychological evaluation should have been 
conducted before her sentencing so that the trial court would have the benefits of 
the evaluator's insights in fashioning an appropriate sentence. (Appellant's brief, 
p. 10.) However, each of these cases is readily distinguishable from the current 
1 situation. In Banburv, the defendant exhibited bizarre behaviors throughout the 
entirety of the criminal proceedings, including telling an investigating officer that 
he was a F.B.I. undercover operative and his invention of a non-existent family. 
! Banbury, 145 ldaho at 266-67, 178 P.3d at 631-32. Further, the PSI writer noted 
that the defendant had trouble distinguishing reality from fiction. Id. For these 
reasons, the court of appeals determined that a psychological evaluation would 
have aided the court in assessing Banbury's true culpability for his offense, his 
suitability for probation, and the type of treatment that should be ordered or 
recommended during probation or incarceration. Banbury, 145 ldaho at 268, 178 
P.3d at 633. Unlike Banbury, Schultz exhibited no bizarre or irrational behaviors 
during her course of her criminal proceedings, and, thus, a psychological 
evaluation would not have helped the district court in fashioning its sentence. 
Coonts is also distinguishable. In Coonts, the defendant requested a 
psychological evaluation, which the district court denied. Coonts, 137 Idaho at 
151-.52, 44 P.3d at 1206-07. Thus, the appellate court reviewed the decision 
under the "abuse of discretion" standard rather than requiring the Coonts to show 
that the district court "manifestly disregarded" the provision of I.C.R. 32. 
Here, a psychological evaluation would not have resulted in a different 
sentence or in probation. Because of Schultz's prior criminal record and inability 
or unwillingness to follow through with treatment recommendations, the court 
would not have sentenced Schultz any differently, even if it had had the benefit of 
a psychological evaluation. Because an evaluation would not have changed the 
court's reasoning or the outcome of sentencing, Schultz has failed to show that 
her mental condition was a significant factor in sentencing or good cause to order 
an evaluation. Thus, the district court did not manifestly disregard the provisions 
of I.C.R. 32 at sentencing. 
II. 
Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction And Ordered Her Oriainal Sentence 
Imposed 
A. Introduction 
Schultz completed her first retained jurisdiction and was granted 
probation. However, Schultz's performance on her second rider was abysmal 
and the district court correctly relinquished jurisdiction and ordered her sentence 
executed. 
Schultz argues that, given all of the facts of her case, the district court 
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction after her second period of 
retained jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.) The record, however, 
supports the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction and order her 
sentence executed. 
B. Standard of Review 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 ldaho 71 1, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); 
State v. Lee, 117 ldaho 203,205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. Schultz Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencinq Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction And Ordered Her 
Oriainal Sentence Imposed 
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." I.C. 5 19- 
2601 (4). A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse 
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 ldaho 193, 194,687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). 
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction in this case is 
reasonable. After completion of her first rider, Schultz was placed on probation 
on November 2 ,  2006. (Augment: Suspension Of Sentence and Order of 
Probation.) In her report of probation violation, Schultz's probation officer wrote: 
Ms. Shultz has been given the opportunity to participate in 
treatment and counseling through Adult Mental Health, but fails to 
follow through with treatment recommendations. She has lost two 
jobs during the past three to four months for failure to show up 
when scheduled. To her credit, however, Ms. Schultz is enrolled at 
the College of Southern Idaho, and has been taking classes since 
the beginning of the spring semester. I have requested that she 
provide a copy of her grade report, if received, copies will be 
provided. However, since November of 2006, she has been 
discharged from three group homes for failure to abide by house 
rules and regulations. Now Ms. Schultz is facing a pending felony 
charge for Delivery of a Controlled Substance. 
(Augment: Report of Probation Violation.) Between November 2 ,  2006, and her 
probation violation disposition hearing on July 19, 2007, Schultz was convicted of 
an additional felony in Twin Falls County and disposition on a second felony in 
Twin Falls County was pending. (7119107 Tr., p. 6 ,  L. 15 - p. 7 ,  L. 25.) The Twin 
Falls County district court retained jurisdiction in both cases. (7119107 Tr., p. 7 ,  
Ls. 18-25; 12110107 APSI, Cover letter.) Based on the sentences in the Twin 
Falls County cases and because of Schultz's mental health issues, the district 
court gave her the opportunity to complete a second rider. (7119107 Tr., p. 10, L. 
Schultz arrived at the South Boise Women's Correctional Center on 
September 27, 2007. (12110107 APSI, Cover letter.) Less than 3 months later, 
the warden at the correctional center recommended that the district court 
relinquish jurisdiction. (12110107 APSI, Cover letter.) The recommendation was 
based on Schultz's lack of treatment-readiness and her demonstrated lack of 
change while placed at the correctional center. (12110107 APSI, p. 4.) 
The APSI writer noted, "[wlhen Ms. Schultz arrived at [the correctional 
center], she was counseled to develop a solid aftercare plan, to include mental 
health. Ms. Schultz did not develop any plan for aftercare; she simply wrote the 
names and addresses of three providers. This is significant because of her 
failure to follow a case plan while on probation." (12/10/07 APSI, p. 3.) 
The APSI writer also concluded that Schultz did not "demonstrate any 
behavior that would indicate that she was treatment ready, as evidenced by her 
attempt to manipulate staff." (12/10/07 APSI, p. 3.) Schultz asked a facilitator to 
allow her to attend a group that had just started because she "would be able to 
finish earlier." (12/10/07 APSI, p. 3.) The writer concluded, "[iln light of the fact 
that this is her second retained jurisdiction, we would have expected her to focus 
on how she could successfully 'stay out' of prison, as opposed to just 'getting out' 
of prison." (12/10107 APSI, p. 3.) The APSI writer further noted that Schultz had 
the tendency to lie unless confronted with conflicting information. (12/10107 
APSI, p. 3.) 
in addition, while on her second rider, Schultz received a mental health 
evaluation. (12/10/07 APSI, p. 4.) The mental health evaluation concluded: 
Ms. Schultz demonstrated compliance during her first rider 
and completed the expectations of the required groups. However, 
it is evident that this treatment was not sufficient in addressing 
issues that prevent her from being successful in the community. 
She failed to participate in mental health services provided in the 
community. She was unable to maintain appropriate living situation 
or employment. She continues to rely on maladaptive behaviors 
rather than healthy coping skills. Ms. Schultz had a limited time at 
SBWCC to participate in a second rider (90 days). She has not 
exhibited significant insight to expect substantial behavior changes 
or an ability to be successful in the community at this time. She 
continues to minimize and justify her behaviors. It is unlikely that 
the rider program provides enough time to address the needs of 
this individual. 
(12110107 APSI, Mental Health Evaluation.) 
I Schultz's case management team, which included case managers, 
i security, druglalcohol specialists, education staff and mental health 
I 
professionals, agreed that Schultz was not a good candidate for probation 
I because of her continued manipulation and failure to take responsibility. 
(12110107 APSI, p. 3.) The team recommended relinquishing jurisdiction with the 
expectation that Schultz would eventually meet the criteria to participate in 
I 
I Therapeutic Community while in prison, which could assist her in changing her 
self-destructive behaviors. (1 211 0107 APSI, p. 3.) 
A jurisdictional review hearing was held on December 14, 2007. (Order 
I on Motion To Relinquish Jurisdiction.) The district court considered Schultz's 
request for probation and the state's recommendation that Schultz's sentence be 
executed. (12114107Tr., p. 11, L.21 -p. 12, L. 11; p. 13, L .6 -p .  14, L.21.) At 
that hearing the district court conducted a balancing act, weighing the factors in 
favor of probation against aggravating factors. (12114107 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-7.) The 
district court explained to Schultz that the factors weighing in favor of probation 
included that she had a probation plan, that she was willing to apply to mental 
health court, that Schultz realized that she didn't fully take advantage of the 
mental health court option in the past, that she was willing to ask for help, and 
that she had people to help with her addiction problems. (12114107 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 
I 3-16.) However, in concluding that relinquishing jurisdiction was the more 
I 
appropriate alternative, the district court addressed Schulz and stated: 
The factors that favor serving this sentence imposed and 
having imprisonment are these: The addendum to the PSI is very 
clear and very solid and very strong in favor of this Court 
relinquishing jurisdiction. Your mental health evaluation says that 
the best thing for you really would be to be in the therapeutic 
community program in the structured setting in prison. 
I'm well aware that this is your second rider. That's certainly 
not an option afforded to everyone. I'm concerned about your 
probability of reoffending as demonstrated by the fact that you've 
got a Twin Falls County conviction that is pending now in front of 
Judge Stoker, and I believe you're coming back for a rider review 
on that, so I have to tell you, I think that recommendation has got to 
be the same in both cases, and so I would find that all of the factors 
in my mind stack up to the conclusion that we have afforded you all 
the opportunities to take advantage of the programs twice through 
the rider; that you have not accomplished that, and, therefore, it's 
the conclusion of this Court that I will relinquish jurisdiction, and I 
will run this case concurrent with any other sentence that you've 
got. 
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction and order Schultz's 
sentence executed was reasonable in light of Schultz's criminal history, her 
abysmal performance while in her second retained jurisdiction program, and her 
inability to succeed on probation. The district court considered all of the relevant 
information and reasonably concluded that probation was not appropriate. Given 
any reasonable view of the facts, Schultz has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion. 
D. Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Failed, Sua Sponfe, To Reduce Her Sentence Pursuant To Rule 
35 
-
Schultz asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed. 
sua sponte, to reduce her sentence pursuant to Rule 35 upon relinquishing 
jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) The record, however, supports the 
district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction and order the underlying 
sentence executed without reduction. 
Upon relinquishing Schultz's jurisdiction, the district court had the 
authority, pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 35, to sua sponfe reduce the 
underlying sentence imposed upon Schultz's conviction for burglary. I.C.R. 35; 
State v. McCarthy, 145 ldaho 397,400, 179 P.3d 360,363 (Ct. App. 2008). The 
decision of whether to do so was committed to the district court's discretion and, 
as such, Schultz bears the burden on appeal of establishing that the district court 
abused its discretion by not sua sponfe reducing her sentence. Id. 
Where, as here, a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 
136 ldaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001). To carry this burden the appellant 
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Id. A sentences is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to 
achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related 
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id. 
Schultz does not contest that her sentence for burglary is illegal or that it is 
not within statutory limits. Thus, Schultz bears the burden of showing that there 
is no reasonable view of the facts of this case, in light of the goals of sentencing 
that supports the sentence imposed. She has failed to carry this burden. 
Although this was Schulz's first felony conviction, she had been charged 
with at least 10 misdemeanors in the past. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) In addition, prior to the 
district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction, Schultz was convicted of two 
new felonies in two separate cases. (12/10/07 APSI, Cover letter.) Further, as 
discussed above, Schultz performed poorly on her second rider and her case 
management team recommended that Schultz was not a good candidate for 
probation because of her continued manipulation and failure to take responsibility 
for her actions. (12/10/07 APSI, p. 3.) 
Schultz's abysmal performance while on probation and while on her 
second rider does not entitle her to sua sponfe reduction of sentence. Given any 
reasonable view of the facts. Schultz has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Olivia Schultz's 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 16'~ day of December, 2009. 
Deputy zttorney General a 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of December, 2009, served 
a true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
